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Can Lawyers Solve the Problems of
the Tort System?
Richard A. Posnert
The editors have asked me to comment on Professor Howard
Latin's Article in this Symposium,1 I suppose because they regard the
Article as a challenge to views with which I am associated. It is that, for
Professor Latin basically asserts the irrelevance of the economic model of
human behavior to explaining the behavior of individuals faced with
hazards to their health or safety; but having read and reflected on his
article, I am not persuaded to abandon my approach for his.
I shall begin not at the beginning of his long article, but with its
main concrete proposal, which is to make automobile manufacturers
strictly liable in tort for personal injuries resulting from automobile accidents-whether or not the automobile is defective.2 This is an astounding suggestion. Some 50,000 people die every year in auto accidents in
the United States, and the average value of a life for tort purposes must
be a million dollars by now. Professor Latin's proposal implies subjecting the automobile industry to a new tort liability of some $50 billion for
death cases alone,' and probably an equal or greater amount for nonfatal
injuries and for property damage-unless Professor Latin is right that
most of these harms can be avoided, and cheaply too, by air bags, or
"puncture-resistant gas tanks," or better brakes and steering mechanisms, or other safety appliances. Automobile prices probably would
skyrocket, though automobile liability and accident insurance rates
would fall.
But I am interested less in the proposal than in the reason for it, and
less in the reason than in what it tells us about a certain type of legal
scholarship. Professor Latin has persuaded himself that enterprises are
so much more likely than individuals to respond to legal rules regulating
safety that they ought to be made liable for all, or almost all, accidents in
which they are involved. He has persuaded himself of this proposition
not by scientific study of how enterprises and individuals respond to legal
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University
of Chicago School of Law. A.B. 1959, Yale College; LL.B. 1962, Harvard University. I am grateful
to William Landes, Richard Levy, and Helane Morrison for helpful comments on a previous draft.
1. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 677
(1985).
2.
3.

Id. at 726-29; see also id. at 689-92.
Id. at 691. Professor Latin says billions and leaves it at that.
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rules, but by intuition reinforced by a rather casual empiricism. The government estimates that air bags would save many lives, yet the auto manufacturers won't install them unless forced to do so, because consumers
don't want to pay the cost.4 So Professor Latin, who believes these consumers to be short-sighted, proposes to induce the manufacturers to
install air bags anyway, by making them liable for all the lives lost in
auto accidents,' and even, perhaps, for lives lost when people drive into
bridge abutments or when drunks run down pedestrians. Maybe he
would not go quite so far. He reserves the question of drunk driving, and
in another part of the article says that he would not make the manufacturer of a knife liable to someone who cut himself while using it as a
toothpick.6 On the other hand, he is inclined to make the manufacturer
of airplane glue liable to people who are injured sniffing it to get high,
because that misuse of the product is foreseeable; 7 and it is equally foreseeable to a maufacturer of automobiles that some of the people who
drive its cars will be drunk. Thus, the logic of his argument points to
making the automobile manufacturer liable for drunk-driving accidents,
too.
What are we to call legal scholarship that comes up with proposals
of this sort, on grounds of this sort? It is not legal-doctrinal scholarship.
Although Professor Latin cites cases, he is not interested in exploring the
relations between cases, discovering the hidden rationales of legal rules,
or finding new patterns; the cases merely illustrate his thesis that organizations are more responsive than individuals to the incentives created by
tort liability. The article is not economic analysis, either; it does not use
economics consistently or systematically. For example, while acutely
sensitive-perhaps hypersensitive-to the information costs of individual
consumers or drivers in making safety choices, Professor Latin is insensitive to information and agency costs within organizations.' Those costs,
however, might impair, or even obliterate, the transmission of safety
directives within the organization. Such costs have to be compared with
the information costs of drivers, consumers, etc., in trying to avoid accidents by complying with norms of tort law. Professor Latin does not
make this comparison, and, as we shall see, he ignores evidence that
nonorganization man is a more efficient accident preventer than he
believes.
4.

Many consumers are afraid of air bags, since when the bag fills with air, the driver loses

control of the car.
5. Latin, supranote 1, at 691-92. Latin assumes the cost of the air bags will be less than the
benefits to the auto manufacturers in reduced tort damages.
6. Id. at 732 n.235.
7. Id. at 713.
8. Yet those costs have long been a particular concern of Professor Latin's favorite economists, such as Herbert Simon and Oliver Williamson.
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Professor Latin also does not have a firm grip on the concept of
externality, which is, or should be, fundamental to any analysis of safety
regulation. It is one thing to force people to take account of the costs
that they impose on unwilling others. Such "external" costs are a traditional and relatively uncontroversial concern of public policy. It is
another and more dubious thing to force people to protect themselves.
Paternalistic rationales are controversial. Thus the air bag, which protects only the occupant and not the victims of his carelessness (except the
front-seat passenger, if there is one)-which indeed may endanger
others 9-is a less appropriate focus of public-policy concern than inadequate brakes or steering mechanisms. But they are all one to Professor
Latin. He says, moreover, that high insurance premiums for risky drivers may lead them to buy cheaper and smaller cars in order to keep down
their driving costs, but that this won't increase safety, because small cars
are more vulnerable in crashes. 'I He is wrong; safety will be increased.
A pedestrian or another driver is likely to suffer less severe injuries if hit
by a small car than a large one. This is all to the good; and since a driver
is more vulnerable in a small car, he may drive more safely-all the better. And notice how in pointing out that tort liability may increase the
demand for smaller cars, Professor Latin has unwittingly made a point
against his thesis that liability does not affect individuals' behavior. This
is also true if (as he speculates) high liability insurance premiums deter
some people from driving cars altogether, and induce them to substitute
motorcycling or hitchhiking. Professor Latin says that hitchhiking and
motorcycling are dangerous." But a hitchhiker does not create a safety
risk to anyone else, and a motorcyclist creates less danger to others than
does an automobile driver. So the external costs of highway accidents
will be reduced if liability insurance rates induce some automobile drivers to become hitchhikers or motorcyclists.
Professor Latin's most serious economic error involves his refusal to
take seriously economic studies that find that individuals-specifically,
automobile drivers-do respond to legal rules. These studies show that
liability insurance premiums affect the decision to drive, z that the
number of automobile deaths has risen as a result of the no-fault movement (perhaps by as much as 15% in some states),'" and that safety-belt
requirements increase the number of pedestrian deaths because people
9. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
10. Latin, supra note 1, at 728.
11. Id.
12. See R. Grayston, Deterrence in Automobile Liability Insurance (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business 1971).
13. See Landes, Insurance,Liability, andAccidents: A Theoretical and EmpiricalInvestigation
of the Effect of No-FaultAccidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49, 50 (1982).
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who feel safer drive faster. 14 The first two studies are the most pertinent,

because they show that the consequences of liability (or nonliability),
though pecuniary, affect safety behavior. The third suggests, consistently, that people make rational tradeoffs in the face of danger.
There is a contrary literature in psychology, to which Professor

Latin refers. But he is not entitled simply to dismiss the economic studies, as he does, on the sole ground that they rest on unrealistic premises
about human behavior.
The fact that some decisionmaking undoubtedly occurs on the unconscious level in no way suggests that people can achieve optimal unconscious choices. Unless the unconscious mind is omniscient, possesses
infinite computational and attentional capacities, and is free from cognitive biases, unconscious decisionmaking could not possibly achieve maximizing results in all cases. To put it another way, there is no evidence
and no reason to presume that the unconscious mind is superhuman"5
This passage reveals a fundamental misconception about the economic

approach to human behavior: that its validity depends on the unrealistic
assumption that people have superhuman mental qualities. This is a
common misconception of lawyers and is worth taking a moment to try
to dispel.

Economic models frequently are built from unrealistic assumptions.
For example, the conventional model of perfect competition assumes a
market that consists of an extremely large number of small firms making
the identical product. It assumes that no firm can affect the market price
by altering its own output and that neither buyers nor sellers have any
search costs. These assumptions commonly are false. Nevertheless, the
model is quite good at predicting things like the response of the price of
cigarettes or gasoline to the imposition of an excise tax. More refined
14. See Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 677 (1975).
Many other economic studies, which Professor Latin does not refer to, also find that people behave
rationally in response to dangers to health and safety. See, eg., Dardis, The Value of a Life: New
Evidencefrom the Marketplace, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 1077 (1980); Olson, An Analysis of Wage Differentials Received by Workers on DangerousJobs, 16 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 167 (1981); Schneider,
Klein & Murphy, GovernmentalRegulation of CigaretteHealth Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 575
(1981); Thaler & Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the LaborMarket, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPrIoN 265 (N. Terleckyj ed. 1975). There is also economic evidence that Professor Latin might have cited, but does not, suggesting that, as he believes, people do
underestimate the benefits of safety devices-specifically, of seat belts. See Arnould & Grabowski,
Auto Safety Regulation: An Analysis of Market Failure, 12 BELL J. ECON. 27 (1981).
Incidentally, Professor Latin is wrong to use negligence cases as evidence that people are irrational; the accidents that the law of negligence fails to deter are a biased sample of behavior toward
safety. He might as well say that the criminal law does not deter, because we observe crimes being
committed. Yet there is much evidence that it does deter. For a review of the literature, see D.
PYLE, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ch. 3 (1983). It does not deter perfectly, but that is because the costs of criminal sanctions are so high. See Posner, An Economic
Theory of CriminalLaw, (forthcoming in the Columbia Law Review, October 1985).
15. Latin, supra note 1, at 685 n.46. (emphasis in original).
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models may yield even better predictions, 6 but the simple, unrealistic
model does quite well.' 7 This is possible because the builders of economic models, for the sake of simplicity or logical rigor, often make more
demands on reality than they have to. It cannot be proved mathematically that a firm will be a price-taker (i.e., cannot alter the market price
by changing its output), unless the number of firms in the market is infinite. As a matter of fact, though, a firm may be a price-taker when there
are only ten firms in the market-maybe only two, or if entry into the
market is sufficiently easy, one. Similarly, economic studies of behavior
which implicitly assume, unrealistically, that the consumer "possesses
infinite computational and attentional capacities" may still predict correctly how consumers will respond to incentives created by a seat-belt
law, or by no-fault automobile compensation plans, or by liability insurance rates. Professor Latin is oblivious to this possibility, which is why
he thinks it enough to point out that the economic studies.rest on unrealistic assumptions about the human mind, and to pass on.
I do not wish to be understood as denying that people frequently are
inattentive, ignorant about the law and about accident probabilities,
hopelessly clumsy, and so forth, and that these things blunt the effectiveness of tort law as a deterrent to careless behavior.' 8 As a matter of fact,
these points play an important role in the positive economic theory of
tort law. 19 But granted that tort law is a clumsy system of social control
in many of the areas that Professor Latin is concerned with, the studies I
have cited, particularly the Grayston and Landes studies, suggest that it
is far from totally inefficacious. And all of the alternatives, including the
massive reconstitution of tort law proposed by Professor Latin, are
bound to have very serious problems of implementation and efficacy of
their own. Hence, pointing out the obvious failings of the present tort
system is not very constructive. I repeat that if people are as irrational as
Professor Latin believes, shifting liability from individuals to organizations-which are simply groups of individuals-is unlikely to reduce the
costs of accidents by much, if anything.
I have said that what Professor Latin's article offers us is neither
legal-doctrinal scholarship nor economic scholarship. I add that it is not
empirical scholarship. Professor Latin's favorite source of empirical data
16.

See, e.g., Barzel, An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation, 84 J. POL. ECON.

1177 (1976).
17. For an interesting illustration of this point, see J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 419-20 (3d ed. 1984).
18. It is worth noting, however, that it is fallacious to think that liability insurance per se
"externalizes" the costs of accidents; the insured has to pay the insurance company to share the risk.
19. See, eg., Landes & Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of ProductsLiability, (forthcoming in the Journalof Law and Economics, 1985); Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REv. 851, 874-76, 878-80 (1981).
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is the New York Times; another favorite is the Federal Register. These

sources do not provide firm foundations for multibillion-dollar proposals
for legal change. Professor Latin gives the reader no sense of what the
empirical literature, economic or otherwise,20 can tell us about the costs

and benefits of so radical a restructuring of the law. His article is not an
engineering study, either, despite the references to "puncture-resistant

gas tanks," air bags, and other safety devices. Nor is his article a legislative study along the lines of the influential Keeton-O'Connell book on

no-fault,2" for Professor Latin does not present his proposals in any detail
or explain how and by whom they might actually be put into effect. His

criticism of Professor Calabresi can be turned against himself: he "seldom addresses realistic implementation constraints and seldom provides
concrete illustrations where all relevant considerations are balanced."2 2
Only for "seldom" we might substitute "never."
It seems to me that the day is past when a law professor could ask

for serious consideration of a proposal for radical legal change based on
his intuitions about what is after all an empirical, a policy, an economic,
a legislative question, but not a question of law. I am sure that Professor
Latin has a fine command of tort law and could contribute greatly to that
complex field by using his legal skills to illuminate tort doctrine. And if
he followed the economic approach more closely he might be able to
contribute to the burgeoning economic analyses of tort law and accident
problems. But he first must free himself of the misconceptions that economics does not "work" in the presence of positive information costs,
that organizations have perfect control over their agents and employees,
that definite costs always outweigh indefinite benefits,23 that it is anomalous for economists to "be unwilling to accept people's opinions that
their own choices often do not maximize personal welfare," 2 4 and that
20. See, eg., A. CONARD,

J. MORGAN,

R.

PRATT, C. VOLTZ &

R.

BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE

ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS (1964); H.L. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL
PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (rev. 2d ed. 1980).
21. See R. KEETON &J . O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965).

22. Latin, supra note 1, at 718 n.179.
23. See id. at 682-96. "[W]e have ample evidence about the high costs of the torts system,
while the deterrent value of legal rules is speculative in risk contexts where typical parties are not
effective problem solvers." Id. at 696. Consider a substitution for that assertion: "We have ample
evidence about the high costs of pollution control while the benefits of pollution control are speculative in most contexts." If one made such a substitution, Professor Latin would be-rightly-horrified, though the statement would then be even more accurate.
24. Id. at 685 n.45. Professor Latin appears to believe, inconsistently as it seems to me, both
that people's conscious assessments of their motives should be accepted at face value and that the
Freudian theory of the unconscious is true. He is very free with speculation about human behavior.
He thinks it apparent, for example, that tort rules will not affect the behavior of a person whose pet
animal is in danger. I do not understand his theory of human behavior. Further complicating the
picture is the fact that Professor Latin harbors the common misconception that rationality presupposes consciousness, so that unless people think they are comparing the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, they are not being rational, whatever their objective behavior may suggest.
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social insurance is unproblematic. Professor Latin might even be able to
contribute to economics, by reconstructing-and then testing-a more
realistic model of human behavior toward danger than one that abstracts
from information costs. He has not done that; he provides no data to
counter the economic evidence that he so summarily dismisses. His article seems to me to occupy an uneasy middle area between law and science, to be a kind of rootless policy analysis that I do not find convincing
when used as a basis for proposing radical changes in law-to be "multidisciplinary" in an unsatisfactory sense.2 5
I shall end with two of Professor Latin's specific examples that have
a special interest to students of tort law-and the second, to any redblooded American as well. The first is the famous Vincent case, where
the owner of a pier was allowed to recover from a shipowner the damages
that the ship had caused to the pier during a storm.2 6 The damage could
have been avoided if the ship had cast off from the pier, but then the ship
might have been lost, and the loss would have been greater than the damage to the pier. Professor Latin thinks there should be no liability in such
a case, because the parties have equal knowledge of the risks, in contrast
to what he conceives to be the situation between an auto manufacturer
and a driver. I disagree, and think the case rightly decided. The owner
of the pier rendered the shipowner a valuable service, for which ordinarily he would as a businessman expect to be paid. It seems at a minimum
he should be compensated for out-of-pocket costs in rendering the
service. 27
The second example is Professor Latin's proposal that the owners of
baseball and other athletic stadiums be strictly liable to any spectator hit
by a ball, or injured while scrambling for a ball, or beaten up by a drunk,
or otherwise injured at the game. This seems to me a particularly doctrinaire application of his thesis. Even without the sanctions of tort law,
the stadium owner has every incentive to optimize the safety of the spectators in order to maximize ticket price and attendance. The dangers are
hardly concealed and for the most part are best prevented by the potential victims themselves. It seems to me fantastic to suppose that if Professor Latin's proposal is adopted stadium owners will put a net in front
of all the spectators or impose a sobriety test on spectators who drink
beer. Strict liability will just be a form of compulsory insurance. There
But rationality as the word is used by economists is an external standard, so that it is no solecism to
speak of a rational frog or a rational pigeon.
25. Picking and choosing among and within the disciplines is not multidisciplinary scholarship. To call Herbert Simon "the Nobel laureate economist" and "an influential theorist," and
George Stigler a "Chicago economist," is I suppose what Professor Latin would call a Freudian slip.
26. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910).
27. See Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans,and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 113 (1978).
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is also a killjoy quality about the suggestion which should not go unnoticed and which provides an appropriate coda to my lament.
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